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Regulating Multinational Corporate
Concentration-The European
Economic Community
JOHN TEMPLE LANG
It is the purpose of this article to discuss the policies and
goals of the efforts of the European Communities to regulate multinational
corporate concentration. For reasons that will become clear in the course of
the article, it is necessary to start by outlining the means available to the
European Communities, both presently and potentially, to promote these
policies. It is not possible to see what those policies might be or how they are
likely to develop without understanding the practical implications of the vari-
ous legal rules on which the Community might rely in the future.
This article does not deal directly with merger regulation under the
European Coal and Steel Community Treaty (ECSC Treaty), or with pro-
cedural questions, although both of these are of some interest in connection
with the main topic.
SOME BASIC CONCEPTS: DOMINANT MARKET POWER AND OLIGOPOLIES
The basic provisions for antitrust enforcement in the European Community
(Community) are found in Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty. Article 85
prohibits restrictive agreements and enumerates several forms of restriction
that fall within the ban. Article 86 prohibits the abuse of a dominant market
position by one or more firms. Both articles require some effect on trade
between the members of the European Community.
The EEC Treaty makes it clear that dominant positions are not them-
selves unlawful. It is only the abuse of a dominant position, including all
kinds of anticompetitive and exclusionary behavior that is prohibited.' There-
fore, even a monopoly or other clearly dominant corporation does not have to
prove that it acquired its position legitimately by "superior skill, foresight and
industry."2 No action can be taken to end the dominance of a corporation as
such, no matter how undesirable its market power may appear to be, nor how
John Temple Lang is a solicitor, Republic of Ireland and legal adviser, EEC Commis-
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often or how seriously it may have abused it.3 This explains and justifies a
concept of dominance that is broader, and is applicable to corporations with
smaller market shares, than the concept of monopoly under U.S. antitrust law.
THE CONTINENTAL CAN JUDGMENT AND ITS LIMITATIONS
In 1973 the Court of Justice rendered its judgment in Europemballage Cor-
poration and Continental Can Co. Inc. v. Commission.4 The Court of Justice
held that it is a violation of Article 86 of the EEC Treaty5 for a corporation
already in a dominant position to acquire a competitor, if the acquisition
strengthens its position so that the resulting market power "substantially
fetters competition."6 The Court of Justice rejected the argument that a
violation of Article 86 could be committed only if existing dominant power
was used to carry out the acquisition, and held that structural changes likely
to restrict competition indirectly were prohibited by Article 86 as well as
behavior likely to restrict it directly. Thus, acquisition of a competitor by a
dominant firm is unlawful even if the same acquisition would be lawful in
the absence of a dominant position. On the ultimate question of liability, the
Court of Justice annulled the EEC Commission's (Commission) decision,
holding that the Commission had failed to prove the relevant market; but the
principles stated by the Court of Justice still stand. Although the Court of
Justice's interpretation of Article 86 had been suggested by the Commission
as early as 1966, 7 in 1973 the judgment created some controversy; however,
it is not now seriously questioned that it correctly states the law.
The case law since Continental Can suggests that the Court of Justice
might now accept the notion that any acquisition which substantially in-
creases the market power of an already dominant corporation (or that sub-
stantially reduces the amount of competition remaining) would violate Article
86.8
As a rule of law regulating, or enabling the EEC Commission to regu-
late, corporate concentration, the rule in Continental Can had two serious
limitations. First, the prohibition applies only where at least one of the corpo-
rations involved in the concentration or merger was already dominant within
the meaning of Article 86. Second, the Commission could take action only
after the concentration or acquisition had been carried out and therefore
could not act to prevent the concentration beforehand. The limitations call
for some comments.
The first limitation is less important now than it appeared to be, since
the Court of Justice in United Brands9 held that a corporation with a market
share of only 40-45 percent, but facing only much smaller competitors in the
relevant market and having considerable competitive advantages, can pos-
sess a dominant position. Hence, many more corporations are dominant, and
so subject to Article 86, than was believed in 1973.
The second limitation is also less important than it might appear, since a
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prudent and well-advised corporation is likely to seek informal approval from
the Commission before carrying out a merger that it might later be compelled
to unwind. Even if it does not seek such approval, merger documents almost
always expressly condition the merger on the receipt of all necessary con-
sents including the consents of national antitrust and exchange control au-
thorities as well as that of the EEC Commission. It is true that there are
limits on the legal value of an informal approval from the Commission,
10
although a formal negative clearance, which would have more value, could
be obtained in due course. Unwinding a merger which has been carried out
is an extremely difficult, expensive, and unsatisfactory operation even if it
had been previously contemplated that it may be necessary.
Moreover, it is not completely clear that the Continental Can rule would
apply to the acquisition of a dominant corporation by a smaller competitor,
although this would have substantially the same effect on competition as the
more familiar scenario of a large company acquiring the smaller.
Another problem relates to the substantive content of the rules as to
"abuse" under Article 86. Although the word implies some ethical content,
the Continental Can judgment is expressed objectively." The question
therefore arises: Could an acquisition that undoubtedly had anticompetitive
effects but that was thought desirable for other reasons be permitted under
Article 86? The question (to which there is no clear answer under existing
law) is probably one that would occur more readily to a European antitrust
lawyer than to a U.S. antitrust lawyer. It is perhaps a question of more
theoretical than practical importance under Article 86.
It might, however, be significant since Article 86 prohibits abuse of a
dominant position "in a substantial part" of the Common Market.' 2 Such a
dominant position might exist now in the EEC, or might exist in the future
in one of the new member states, because economic integration had not
brought about a free flow of goods from elsewhere in the EEC. (Indeed, the
abuse might lie precisely in preventing such a flow from taking place.) An
acquisition by a firm which was regionally dominant might have serious
anticompetitive effects in the region in question, and so might be prohibited
under Article 86, even though it was (or would become) reasonable in the
context of the Community as a whole.
A question related to the use of Article 86 in merger cases in practice is
whether the Commission has an implied power under the EEC Treaty to adopt
an interim decision before a final decision prohibiting a dominant firm from
commencing or continuing a course of action which the Commission con-
siders, pending a final decision on the matter, is contrary to Article 86. The
Court of Justice held in National Carbonising 3 that the Commission had such
an implied power under Article 66 of the European Coal and Steel Community
Treaty, but the corresponding question under the EEC Treaty did not come
before the Court of Justice until 1980, when the court held that this power also
exists in both Article 85 and Article 86 cases under the EEC Treaty.'4
There is no doubt that the Continental Can rule would enable the Coin-
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mission to prohibit many undesirable mergers, without any need for new
legislation. Equally, however, it is clear that some mergers which would be
undesirable could not be attacked under the rule.
PROPOSED REGULATION FOR THE CONTROL OF MERGERS: CONTENTS
AND COMMENTS
Primarily because of the two limitations on the Continental Can rule, in 1973
the Commission submitted to the Council of the European Communities
(Council) a proposal for a regulation giving the Commission power to control
mergers. 5 The draft requires prior approval by the Commission for certain
mergers, and applies to mergers even if neither of the corporations involved
is dominant.
The discussions on the draft are still continuing in the Council, six years
later, despite regular urging from the Commission and from the European
Parliament. It is clear that the draft will not be adopted in its original terms,
and it is not yet clear what the final terms of the regulation are likely to be.
The draft regulation has received extensive commentary, but has not been
formally altered since it was published.
The draft regulation declares:
Any transaction which has the direct or indirect effect of bringing
about a concentration between undertakings or groups of undertakings,
at least one of which is established in the common market, whereby
they acquire or enhance the power to hinder effective competition in
the common market or in a substantial part thereof, is incompatible
with the common market in so far as the concentration may affect
trade between Member States.
The power to hinder effective competition shall be appraised by
reference in particular to the extent to which suppliers and consumers
have a possibility of choice, to the economic and financial power of the
undertakings concerned, to the structure of the markets affected, and
to supply and demand trends for the relevant goods or services.'
6
In other words, the draft, in broad terms, made it unlawful to create a
dominant position by means of a concentration.7 The language is the same
as that used in Article 66 of the European Coal and Steel Community
(which, however, contains no overriding exemption for good mergers).
The draft regulation went on to say:
3. Paragraph 1 may, however, be declared inapplicable to concentra-
tions which are indispensable to the attainment of an objective
which is given priority treatment in the common interest of the
Community. 18
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It thereby allows the Commission to permit an anticompetitive merger for
some unspecified overriding purpose, in language much vaguer than Article
85(3). 9 There is a similar provision in German law.
The draft permits smaller concentrations falling below a specified thresh-
old. A merger would be exempt under the draft regulation if:
(1) the aggregate turnover of the undertakings participating in the con-
centration is less than 200 million units of account [U.S. $276 mil-
lion at end August 19791; and
(2) the goods or services concerned by the concentration do not account
in any Member State for more than 25% of the turnover in identical
goods or services which, by reason of their characteristics, their
price and the use for which they are intended, may be regarded as
similar by the consumer.
20
As can readily be imagined, the level at which this threshold should be
drawn has been one of the most controversial aspects of the draft regulation.
The draft also provided an exemption from its prior notification require-
ments: concentrations where the aggregate turnover of the enterprises con-
cerned is between 200 and 1,000 million units of account (U.S. $276 million
and U.S. $1,381 million at the end of August 1979), and also cases where the
firm being acquired was small (turnover less than 30 million units of account
[U.S. $41.43 million]). Turnover in all cases means group turnover, and
includes turnover outside the EEC.
The draft regulation defines concentration in terms of a wide definition
of control, not limited to shareholding or ownership.
2 1
1. The concentrations referred to in Article 1 are those whereby a per-
son or an undertaking or a group of persons or undertakings, ac-
quires control of one or several undertakings.
2. Control is constituted by rights or contracts which, either separately
or jointly, and having regard to the considerations of fact or law
involved, make it possible to determine how an undertaking shall
operate, and particularly by:
(1) Ownership or the right to use all or part of the assets of an
undertaking;
(2) Rights or contracts which confer power to influence the compo-
sition, voting or decisions of the organs of an undertaking;
(3) Rights or contracts which make it possible to manage the busi-
ness of an undertaking;
(4) Contracts made with an undertaking concerning the computa-
tion or appropriation of its profits;
(5) Contracts made with an undertaking concerning the whole or an
important part of supplies or outlets, where the duration of these
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contracts or the quantities to which they relate exceed what is
usual in commercial contracts dealing with those matters.
3. Control is acquired by persons, undertakings or groups of persons or
undertakings who:
(1) Are holders of the rights or entitled to rights under the contracts
concerned;
(2) While not being holders of such rights or entitled to rights
under such contracts, have power to exercise the rights deriv-
ing therefrom;
(3) In a fiduciary capacity own assets of an undertaking or shares in
an undertaking, and have power to exercise the rights attaching
thereto.
4. Control of an undertaking is not constituted where, upon formation
of an undertaking or increase of its capital, banks or financial insti-
tutions acquire shares in that undertaking with a view to selling
them on the market, provided that they do not exercise voting rights
in respect of those shares.
22
Under the draft regulation, the Commission has three months from re-
ceipt of notification to commence proceedings. If it does not act within that
time, the concentration (even if it is one for which prior approval is needed)
may go into effect, but the Commission may make an interim decision re-
quiring suspension of the concentration.' It must then reach a final decision
within nine months. Regulations 17/6224 and 1017/6825 would not apply to
concentrations covered by the regulation and Articles 85 and 86 remain
applicable to mergers not covered by the draft regulation. Moreover, Article
85 and Article 86 liability would be preempted by the regulation in these
cases covered by the regulation. A few comments on this proposed legislation
are worthwhile.
First, market share requirements are unavoidable, but not easy to apply
in practice. It is not clear whether the market concept in the draft regulation
above would be interpreted by the Court of Justice in exactly the same way
as it has interpreted the concept of the relevant market, as for example, in
United Brands and Hoffmann-LaRoche.2 6
Second, merger control is regarded as filling what seems to be a gap in
the Community's antitrust powers, so it is essential that the decision-making
body under the regulation should be the same as for other antitrust ques-
tions, namely, the Commission. Under the merger regulation, the Commis-
sion would have exclusive power in merger cases. In cases under Articles
85-86 its power is not, in theory, exclusive (although in practice national
antitrust authorities never enforce Community law).
Third, the basic principle (preventing mergers creating dominant posi-
tions) is a much narrower one than the principle of substantially lessening
competition found in Section 7 of the Clayton Act.
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Fourth, the market share threshold is based on the market in any one
member state. This means that smaller mergers come under closer scrutiny
in small member states than in large ones since the markets are smaller.
Moreover, the regulation does not expressly contemplate a merger whereby
the merged firms join a group of oligopolists who together have the power to
hinder competition, although Article 86 expressly applies to a dominant posi-
tion held by more than one firm.
Finally, the draft regulation would apply to some joint ventures, al-
though joint ventures are not mentioned specifically. The Commission would
therefore have to ensure that its policy on creation of dominance under the
regulation was in line, mutatis mutandis, with its policy on otherwise similar
joint ventures not falling under the regulation but substantially restricting
competition and falling under Article 85(1).
The Commission has stated five main problems related to the draft regu-
lation: (1) the legal basis for the proposed regulation, (2) the principle of
premerger control, (3) the scope of the regulation, (4) the possibility of dero-
gations from the concept of incompatibility with the Common Market, and
(5) notification of planned mergers and decision-making powers.
2 7
First, the legal basis of the proposed regulation is found in Articles 87 and
235 of the EEC Treaty. (Article 235 gives power to adopt appropriate measure
to take any action necessary to attain any Community objective, where no
other means are provided in the Treaty.) The Legal Affairs Committee of the
European Parliament has stated that it considers this sufficient. 2
8 Second,
premerger control avoids the difficulties of undoing a completed merger,2 and
even if it was not obligatory, enterprises would normally seek informal opin-
ions before putting the merger into operation. Premerger control has worked
under the ECSC Treaty and in Germany. Third, the threshold above which
mergers are prima facie unlawful is of course a key issue, and is one of the
most controversial clauses in the draft regulation. The higher the threshold,
the fewer the number of cases that will warrant examination and the easier it
would be for the Commission, with its limited manpower, to handle them.
30
ARTICLE 85 APPLICATION TO CONCENTRATION
In 1966 the Commission published its Memorandum on Concentrations.3 1 It
examines whether Article 85 could be used to control concentrations, and
sets out the views of certain professors who had been asked by the Commis-
sion for their analysis as well as the Commission's comments on these views
and related issues.
A majority of the professors believed that Article 85 applied to concentra-
tions when three conditions were fulfilled: (1) that competition is appreciably
restricted (sensiblement restreinte), (2) that the concentration results from
an agreement (and not, for example, from the acquisition of shares on a stock
exchange without the agreement of the corporation being acquired), and (3)
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that "legally distinct enterprises remain in existence after the concentration"
is carried out. Whether, according to this interpretation, Article 85 would
offer effective control over concentrations depends on the interpretation of
the third condition. Whatever its exact meaning, it appears to be a condition
which would not be difficult for well-advised corporations to avoid (although
there might be tax and other disadvantages of doing so) through "fusions" of
the legal entities of the participating corporations or by acquisition of the
business of a corporation rather than the shares in the corporation itself
(with, if necessary, the liquidation of the selling corporation).
A minority of the professors considered that Article 85 did not apply to
concentrations because concentrations do not relate to the behavior of enter-
prises but rather modify their internal structure which, it was thought, does
not necessarily limit competition.
The Commission came to the same conclusions as the minority, but for
rather different (and more convincing) reasons. The Commission noted that
national antitrust legislation usually treats mergers and restrictive agree-
ments separately, regarding the latter as prima facie objectionable and the
former as prima facie or generally acceptable. The Commission thought that
the uniform application of Article 85 to both would prohibit too many
mergers or too few restrictive agreements.
Also Article 85(3) was thought inappropriate to mergers since their ef-
fects on competition are not easy to foresee. Moreover, it would be difficult to
approve a merger under Article 85(3), since an exemption can be granted
only if the legally suspect activity is indispensable to obtain the benefits. 32 In
addition, Article 85(3) implies temporary exemptions given only as long as
the conditions required for them are fulfilled; but mergers would need to be
authorized permanently.
And automatic nullity, provided for by Article 85(2), would sometimes be
inappropriate for unlawful mergers, since nullification would have conse-
quential effects on related transactions and on stock ownership and so would
go further than merely reestablishing the previously existing position. The
appropriate way of dealing with an unlawful merger is divestiture.
33
To sum up, the Commission felt that, in view of the structural conse-
quences of mergers, they should be subject to legal rules different from those
applying to agreements. These arguments do not now seem as strong as they
did in 1966, and there are contrary arguments to be drawn from court deci-
sions since then. The contrast between official attitudes at the national level
toward restrictive agreements and mergers is certainly not now as strong as it
once was.34 To apply Article 85 to both restrictive agreements and mergers
does not necessarily mean to apply it uniformly. Granted, it is not always easy
to judge the effect of restrictive agreements on competition, but judging the
effects of mergers does not seem to be necessarily or inherently more diffi-
cult. Indeed in some circumstances it might be easier. The argument that
mergers could only be approved under Article 85(3) if they were "indispens-
able" to achieve the benefits expected of them is of course correct, but it does
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not by any means follow that this would be an unsatisfactory result. (After
all, mergers are always thought to bring some benefits, and the Court of
Justice has recognized preservation of employment as a legitimate matter for
the Commission to take into account under Article 85(3).
3
5
Nor does it follow that Article 85 should be interpreted as not applying to
mergers at all. Exemptions under Article 85(3) are indeed given for specified
periods, but this is mandated by Regulation 17/62, not Article 85(3) itself. As
regards the "nullity" fear, the better view is that Article 85(2) applies to
agreements to set up joint ventures and that ownership of a joint venture is
never void.3 6 If this is true for joint ventures, the same would also be true for
mergers.
The argument that mergers involve changes of ownership 37 to which
Article 85(2) is inappropriate is certainly not applicable to many of the kinds
of mergers covered by the definition of control in the draft merger regulation.
Many of these would not involve any change of ownership but would involve
contracts to which Article 85(2) could reasonably be applied.
More important, the Court of Justice has repeatedly said that Article 3(f)
must be used to interpret Articles 85 and 86.38 Article 3(f) states that it is one
of the Community's tasks to institute "a system ensuring that competition in
the common market is not distorted." In Continental Can the Court stressed
that the antitrust Articles of the Treaty must be interpreted so as to avoid a
lacuna in the law (as there clearly would be if mergers were permitted
freely), and that the distinction between structural changes and behavior is
not decisive if both restrict competition.
39
These arguments all suggest that Article 85 might indeed apply to
mergers between firms neither of which was occupying a dominant position.
It would also obviously be irrational if a dominant firm having a 60 percent
market share was unable to acquire a competitor having a further 30 percent
(which is clearly the law under Continental Can), but if when all the circum-
stances other than market shares were similar, two firms each having a 45
percent market share were entirely free to merge. It could of course be
argued that such a merger was an abuse by the two firms of a jointly held
dominant position, but seems an unsatisfactory approach to the problem
since it could apply only when all the evidence needed to prove joint domi-
nance (whatever that evidence may be, exactly as to which, see below) was
available. This is an anomaly which has been apparent only since Continen-
tal Can.
Some of the reasons given by the Commission seem in retrospect to be
less important than practical considerations which could have been given in
1966. There are two practical reasons for considering Article 85 as being
inapplicable to mergers. First, it was widely believed that most corporations
in most sectors of industry in the European Community were too small to
be efficient or competitive on an international level, and that mergers would
be desirable and should not be inhibited. Indeed the Commission has en-
sured the adoption of various measures intended to facilitate mergers of
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small firms. Second, if Article 85 applies to mergers, it would apply to so
many mergers that the work of the competition directorate general would
be greatly increased. However, the parties to mergers, unlike the parties to
most restrictive agreements, wish to know as soon as possible whether an
antitrust authority will or will not approve of what they are doing. A given
number of merger cases will therefore cause far more pressure from the
participants for quick decisions than the same number of cases involving
restrictive agreements. These are both respectable arguments, and are le-
gitimate policy considerations for a small and, in 1966, relatively inexperi-
enced antitrust authority.
In retrospect, there was another policy reason for not seeking to apply
Article 85 to mergers, whether or not it was in the minds of those responsible
at the time. Europe then contained, and still does, many serious and unjusti-
fiable restrictive agreements. It would certainly have been bad enforcement
policy to divert the attention of the Commission from its first task of dealing
with clearly unlawful agreements and involving it in the much more com-
plex, legally and politically controversial, and time-consuming task of dealing
with mergers. Many of the most basic principles of Community law were not
yet clearly established in 1966; it was obviously the best policy for the Com-
mission to establish them, and to deal with the most obviously and seriously
unlawful arrangements, before launching itself into more difficult and so-
phisticated problems. If this consideration was in the minds of the Commis-
sion in 1966, it was a legitimate and sound reason for the articulated policy
on mergers. But, like the other considerations set out above, the passage of
time may have seriously eroded its validity.
Theoretically, the question whether Article 85 prohibits mergers could
be brought before the Court of Justice at any time by a private litigant,
whether a corporation trying to prevent itself being taken over or a competi-
tor fearing the creation of an overwhelming rival. 40 The Court of Justice
would consider the question in the light of Article 3(f), and might again hold,
as it did in Continental Can, that the EEC Treaty should not be interpreted
as having an important lacuna. If the Court of Justice were to disagree with
the position taken by !he Commission in 1966, it could adopt either of two
interpretations of Article 85: one position would be that Article 85, in the
light of Article 3(f), prohibited mergers creating a corporation or group with a
dominant position. This would be essentially the position under the draft
merger regulation. Alternatively, it could take the position that Article 85
applied to all mergers on the same conditions as to restrictive agreements;
that is, they are prohibited if they appreciably restrict competition (and would
have to be justified under Article 85(3). This would correspond more closely
to the principle in Section 7 of the Clayton Act. With either approach it would
be necessary to prove an effect on trade between member states. Neither
interpretation would require prior authorization for mergers, and neither
would imply that Article 85 would apply to mergers not resulting from agree-
ments between the merging corporations.
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Would the Court of Justice interpret Article 85 to apply to mergers? If
Article 3(f) prohibits strengthening of a dominant position by acquisition of a
competitor, as the Court of Justice held in Continental Can, then it may also
prohibit creation of a dominant position by merging of two nondominant
competitors. If Article 3(f) prohibits the elimination of competition by merger
involving a dominant company, it may prohibit the elimination of competition
by mergers involving nondominant companies. Indeed the Court of Justice in
Continental Can said,
[O]ne cannot assume that the Treaty which prohibits in Article 85 cer-
tain decisions of ordinary associations of undertakings restricting com-
petition without eliminating it, permits in Article 86 that undertakings
after merging into organic unity, should reach such a dominant posi-
tion that any serious chance of competition is practically rendered
impossible .... The endeavour of the authors of the Treaty to maintain
in the market real or potential competition even in cases in which re-
straints on competition are permitted, was explicitly laid down in Arti-
cle 85(3)(b).... Articles 85 and 86 cannot be interpreted in such a way
that they contradict each other, because they serve to achieve the same
aim.... (Article 86) is not only aimed at practices which may damage
consumers directly, but also at those which are detrimental to them
through their impact on an effective competitive structure, such as is
mentioned in Article 3(f) [emphasis added].4'
Certainly there are strong arguments for saying that, since Continental Can,
Article 85 applies to mergers, or at least to mergers which create a dominant
firm.
It hardly needs to be stressed that interpreting Article 85 as applying to
mergers would eliminate certain anomalies and irrational results. If Article
85 does not prohibit mergers, then close cooperation between two firms with
large market shares would be prohibited if it substantially eliminated compe-
tition between them, yet a complete merger, which would end all competition
between them, would be lawful.
JOINT VENTURES
The view that Article 85 applied to joint ventures with restrictive effects on
competition, and to any other arrangements under which economically (and
not merely legally) separate enterprises continued to exist after a transaction,
was expressed clearly by the Commission in the Concentration Memorandum.
However, the principles upon which Article 85 should be applied to joint
ventures have been confused by an argument prompted by, though not
found in, the Concentration Memorandum. The argument centered around
the question of where the line should be drawn between concentrations and
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joint ventures. It was based implicitly on the assumption that concentrations
were exempt from Article 85; therefore, if it could be shown that a joint
venture should be regarded as a concentration, it would not be subject to
Article 85 even if it had the effect of restricting competition. Needless to say,
this assumption was difficult to justify since it implied that Article 85 would
not be applied in situations where it appeared that it should apply fully. The
assumption, however, gained respectability from the undoubted fact that in
German and U.S. antitrust laws joint ventures are dealt with primarily under
the provisions under merger regulation, and not restrictive agreements. It
never became clear why this would necessarily be the appropriate approach
in a legal system with no express merger control legislation, such as the
EEC. The assumption also gained respectability from the habit of describing
some joint ventures as partial concentrations, thereby adding a third impre-
cise basic concept to a field already equipped with two (joint venture and
concentration).
Under the view that Article 85 does not apply to complete mergers, two
approaches were possible. Article 85 could be interpreted as applying to all
agreements except those leading to complete mergers or concentrations, that
is, those after which only one economic entity remains. Alternatively, Article
85 could be interpreted as not applying to any agreements leading to partial
mergers or concentrations (however exactly these should be defined) or a
fortiori to complete mergers or concentrations. Obviously, if the first alterna-
tive correctly stated the law, it would be important to be able to distinguish
between complete mergers and joint venture arrangements. If the second
alternative was the law, it would be important to be able to distinguish
between joint ventures which are partial concentrations and joint ventures
which are not.
Faced with joint venture situations of considerable genuine difficulty
and with a situation of considerable intellectual confusion, the Commission,
conscious that this was ultimately a question to be decided by the Court of
Justice, reacted with caution. In its Sixth Report on competition policy, the
Commission limited the practical scope of the putative partial concentration
theory by saying what, in its opinion, the theory did not mean. In particular,
the Commission stated that no joint venture could be regarded as a concen-
tration exempt from Article 85 if the pooling of the areas of business involved
weakened competition between the parent companies in other areas, particu-
larly in related areas, where the parent firms remained formally independent
of each other.4 2 The other requirement, according to the Commission, of
these "exceptional cases" is that the parent firms must have irreversibly
transferred their business activities in the field in question to the joint ven-
ture. This means that a joint venture could never be regarded as a concentra-
tion unless both the parent firms previously carried on the activities in ques-
tion independently. So understood it is indeed relevant only in "exceptional
cases."
On the assumption that either the first approach is correct and Article 85
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may apply to all joint ventures unless they are really complete mergers, or
that cases of "partial concentrations" are rare enough to be ignored in the
rest of this article, the next question is how to distinguish between joint
ventures and complete mergers. The Commission's Sixth Report makes this
clear: "Cases in which the parent companies transfer all their assets to the
joint venture and themselves become no more than holding companies...
will usually be considered to constitute a merger,"43 that is, a complete
merger. Although in the past difficulties caused by company and tax laws of
member states have given rise to highly complex arrangements such as those
in the Dunlop-Pirelli and Agfa-Gevaert mergers, most people would agree
that the distinction between joint ventures and complete mergers is a genu-
ine distinction in theory, even if it may occasionally be difficult to apply in
practice.
No discussion of this rather complex area of law would be complete
without an examination of the rules applying to joint ventures themselves.
These rules are important because the joint ventures prohibited by Article 85
are primarily those that occur in already concentrated markets.
Under the Continental Can ruling, Article 86 prohibits the extension of
a dominant position through the setting up of a joint venture, or the acquisi-
tion of a share in an existing joint venture. No joint venture cases under
Articles 85 and 86 have yet come before the Court of Justice. However, the
court has laid down several rules which are relevant to joint ventures. Arti-
cles 85 and 86 and Article 3(f) are aimed not only at behavior which may
cause damage to consumers directly, but also at practices which are detri-
mental to them through their impact on an effective structure of competition.
The distinction between measures which concern the structure of the
undertaking and practices which may influence the market cannot be
decisive, for any structural measure may affect market conditions, if it
increases the size and economic power of the undertaking.
44
Article 85(1) applies to agreements which clearly tend to reduce competition,
even if they contain no formal restrictions on the freedom of the enterprises
involved. 45 In assessing the economic effects of a given agreement all the
surrounding economic circumstances must be taken into account.
46
The general principle applied by the Commission is that any agreement
between two or more enterprises under which a corporation is owned or
controlled jointly by them may fall under Article 85 if the agreement has the
effect, directly or indirectly, of restricting or reducing competition between
the parent enterprises or from third parties.
47
The effects on competition may result from express contractual clauses
or may result naturally from the mere existence and operation of the joint
venture and of the relationship of the parent enterprises with it.4 8 If such
effects are reasonably foreseeable, it is irrelevant that there are no contrac-
tual restraints on the freedom of the parties to compete.
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Joint ventures may have a variety of different kinds of effects on compe-
tition. For example, if the joint venture sells the products of its parents to
third parties, it may largely eliminate competition between them. Even if it
does not sell all of its parents' products, they will tend to align their prices on
the joint venture's prices. 49 If the joint venture sells its products or services to
its parent corporations, or does research for them, it may reduce competition
between them, especially if its products are end products. Again the parents
may tend to align their prices. Even if the joint venture is selling to third
parties and is not in competition with either of its parents, the existence of
the joint venture may preclude the parents from entering the market inde-
pendently of one another, as they would otherwise have done in the absence
of the joint venture.
50
In an oligopolistic market a joint venture between two oligopolists may
alter the structure of the market, both reducing competition between the
parents and making it less likely that other competitors will enter the market.
5 1
If the joint venture has taken over all the activities of one or both parents in a
given sector, this might indicate inability to continue independent operations
in the market, or a wish to end competition with a major competitor. Much
depends on circumstances. The facts of the only case involving a situation of
this kind were unusual, involving vertical relationship between two corpora-
tions neither of which were in a position to remain in the market without close
links with some other firms already in the market.5 2 Alternatively, a joint
venture may be a forum for coordinating the parents' policies, but this has
never been the sole ground for a finding that the joint venture fell under
Article 85(1); rather, it was used as an argument in a case where there was
specific evidence that this was the intention of the parents.
53
Article 85(1) will apply to any of these kinds of effects on competition
only if in the circumstances they are significant. Even if Article 85(1) ap-
plies, a joint venture can often be justified under Article 85(3). The extent of
the effect on competition is often crucial in joint venture cases. Joint ven-
tures where one or both parents, or the joint venture itself, have a large
market share, or where the joint venture has the effect of eliminating most of
the competition between its parents, are particularly likely to be unjustifiable.
The better view is that joint ventures which are prohibited by Article 85
are not void (though express restrictive clauses in joint venture agreements
may be). They are, however, subject to divestiture. 4
The Commission has so far approved a number of joint ventures under
Article 85(3), and has prohibited a joint venture only in one case, 55 in which
the agreement offered no advantages and involved parties with large market
shares.
In theory and in practice, it is important to ensure as far as possible that
an antitrust policy is consistent and uniform across the whole spectrum, from
cartels through joint ventures to complete mergers. As the Commission has
never claimed power to control complete mergers (except in cases under
Article 86), it has limited itself to ensuring that its policies on joint ventures
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and cartels are consistent with one another, and that firms cannot do by joint
venture what they could not do without a joint venture.
ARTICLE 86 APPLICATION TO DOMINANT POSITION,
OLIGOPOLY, AND MERGERS
Article 86 expressly prohibits any abuse by more than one undertaking of a
dominant position. This makes it clear that there may be a violation of the
EEC Treaty by several dominant enterprises in circumstances to which Arti-
cle 85 does not apply, that is, where there is no collusive or concerted behav-
ior. Oligopoly is not, of course, itself unlawful under EEC law. Thus far,
however, there are no decisions involving a dominant position held by more
than one firm.
In any market in which a small number of large firms held most or all of
the market, the firms in question will be acutely aware of one another's
behavior. The market strategy of each must take account of the probable
reactions of the others, and they will tend to act similarly, especially if the
other oligopolists' behavior can be accurately foreseen.
Several authors56 have suggested that Article 86 applies to an abuse by a
small number of enterprises in an oligopolistic market, even if no one of them
has overall dominance and even without any concerned practice between
them, at least when all behave in a parallel manner.
For example, if all the members of an oligopoly charge excessive prices
for their products, this can occur over a significant period of time only if
there is no significant price competition between them (and no significant
price competition from outside the oligopoly). Excessive prices and absence
of price competition might coexist with competition between the members of
the oligopoly in other respects. Article 86 seems to be applicable both when
there is no competition between oligopolists and when the only competition
between them, for whatever reason, does not have the effect of eliminating
the allegedly illegal collective behavior. In other words, if all the oligopolists
practice the behavior that is said to be abusive, the fact that there may be
competition between the oligopolists in other respects is irrelevant.
Most abuses of dominant power occur because normal competition does
not occur or is not sufficient to prevent them. If market power is being used
in the same way by a number of enterprises, the fact that the users of it are
not a monolithic bloc in other respects does not make the market power any
less real, or any less liable to abuse.
But, if it is not necessary for several enterprises to occupy a dominant
position in 'order to eliminate competition between them at all, what are the
tests of a collective dominant position? Basically, the tests of market power
are the same whether it is held by one or more enterprises. The power to
behave independently of outsiders, to exclude competition, to determine
prices or to control a significant proportion of total production or distribution,
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without being subject to the influence of competitors, purchasers, or sup-
pliers, may be exercised collectively. If dominant power is power which is
great enough to be abused, then collective dominant power is power which
may be abused collectively.
As will be recalled, Continental Can held that Article 86 prohibits an
anticompetitive merger by a firm occupying, alone, a dominant position. Arti-
cle 86 clearly prohibits abuse by more than one firm occupying a dominant
position. How far can Article 86 be used to control mergers not involving the
only dominant firm in the market? Several cases need to be considered:
1. If two firms are shown to hold a dominant position (whatever the precise
requirements for such a finding), it seems clear that if they merge with
one another, the merger would be under Continental Can a violation of
Article 86. Similarly, if they set up a joint venture which has, or is likely
to have, substantial anticompetitive effects on their behavior, this is un-
lawful under Article 86 even if Article 85 does not apply;
2. If three firms are shown to hold a dominant position, and two of them
merge with one another, a more difficult question arises.
3. Moreover, two firms may jointly hold a dominant position, and one of
them may merge with a third, nondominant competitor in the same
market, thereby increasing its own market power and the aggregate
market power of the two dominant firms. Here again the question arises
whether this might be unlawful.
Article 86 speaks of "abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant
position" not of "abuse by an undertaking occupying, alone or with other
undertakings, a dominant position." Should it therefore be interpreted as
prohibiting only conduct committed by all the undertakings involved? If the
answer is yes, the acquisition of a competitor by one of several dominant
firms is lawful, and probably the merger of two dominant firms, where a third
exists, is also lawful.
On the other hand, Article 86 could also be interpreted as prohibiting
abuses committed by one or more, but not necessarily all, dominant firms
(provided that competition between the dominant firms does not prevent the
putatively unlawful behavior from continuing, or being successful, in which
case the firms are not jointly dominant in the relevant respect, according to
the theory suggested here).
To illustrate this proposition, suppose a market dominated by two firms
each having a 45 percent market share, the remaining 10 percent being held
by a few small corporations unable to offer serious competition. Suppose that
firm A, one of the two dominant firms, begins to offer fidelity rebates and
require its customers and distributors to deal exclusively with it by various
means. Is this contrary to Article 86?
It is submitted that it is. This behavior would strengthen A's market
position vis-h-vis its only serious rival, and its minor competitors. It would
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make the market shares of the two big firms more static. Competition would
be further reduced. Also, if A's behavior is lawful, the absurd result is that it
would become unlawful as soon as its chief rival began to practice the same
behavior. This result would be not only irrational and contrary to principle,
but intolerable, since it would deny to the rival the freedom to compete with
its major competitor on equal terms, and would favor the first oligopolist in
adopting new anticompetitive practices. One could envision a type of race by
each oligopolist to initiate behavior that, but for the fact that it was the only
company so behaving, would be unlawful and contrary to competition in the
Common Market. The EEC Commission and the Court of Justice, it is sug-
gested, should be particularly ready to insist on the preservation of that
degree of competition which can exist between oligopolists jointly holding a
dominant position, and should prevent either of them from strengthening its
position by anticompetitive means at the expense of anyone else.
It seems to follow that a merger or acquisition by one of several firms
together having a dominant position will, if the effect of the merger on
competition is sufficiently significant, constitute a violation of existing Com-
munity law, whether or not the other firms involved in the merger also
occupy the collective dominant position. The practical significance of this
result for the Community power to control concentration in already concen-
trated industries is considerable.
However, it must not be assumed that a merger of one oligopolist with a
smaller competitor necessarily has adverse effects on competition. A smaller
number of stronger competitors may cause intensified competition57 and an
acquistion by the smallest oligopolist of a smaller firm (or of a large firm
outside the relevant market) may strengthen the former's position and pro-
mote competition. Similarly, although a merger creating a jointly dominant
firm, for example, creating the second firm in a duopoly, might be unlawful,
it might also be desirable if on balance it strengthened rather than reduced
such competition as existed in the market. If such an affirmative competition-
enhancing defense is proved in fact, it apparently would be valid under
Community antitrust law. This is because a merger by a jointly dominant
firm that increased competition appears to be lawful under the Continental
Can principle.
Similar questions may be raised under the draft merger regulation,
which prohibits any concentration whereby the participants "acquire or en-
hance the power to hinder effective competition." Does this mean the exclu-
sive power to hinder effective competition, or the power, whether alone or
with other firms not involved in the concentration, to hinder effective compe-
tition? The interpretation of this is slightly easier than that of Article 86,
however, and may not depend on it. Since Article 86 makes it clear that more
than one enterprise can occupy a dominant position, that is, can have the
power to hinder effective competition, it would follow that a concentration
which enhances that power would fall under the regulation. The power of all
the holders of a collectively dominant position would be enhanced if two of
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them merge and the third does not, or if one of two dominant firms acquires
a third competitor, but of course only the firms involved in the merger or
acquisition would have violated the EEC Treaty.
SUMMARY OF COMMUNITY LAW ON CONCENTRATIONS
In summary, the EEC clearly has power under existing law to prevent
mergers and acquisitions involving firms which are already dominant.
Under well-established law a considerable number of firms are considered
dominant, and are thus subject to all the duties which Article 86 imposes,
at least in narrow markets. The EEC also has power to prevent already
dominant firms from increasing their market power through anticompetitive
practices, and also to prevent oligopolies from behaving in corresponding
ways (although in this respect the extent of the law is unclear). In general,
however, there is no power to put an end to dominance or oligopoly as
such, and until either new legislation or a new interpretation of the EEC
Treaty is adopted there is no power to prohibit mergers involving previously
nondominant firms even if their effect is to create a clearly dominant firm,
or even a monopoly. Under existing law there is no power to approve a
merger involving a dominant firm that would have the effect of substan-
tially restricting competition, no matter how desirable the merger might
seem on other grounds. Joint ventures can be adequately controlled under
existing law. The Community probably already has power to prohibit
mergers involving one or more of the members of an oligopoly who together
occupy a dominant position.
The Community will have no power to control mergers between corpora-
tions which after the merger will not be dominant (either alone or together
with other firms) under the proposed merger regulation; such a power could
come only from the wider of the two theoretically possible new interpreta-
tions of Article 85. This adds up to a position which is not wholly satisfactory,
but which provides powers which are by no means insignificant and which
so far have been little used.
SPECIAL PROBLEMS OF APPLICATION:
INTERFACE OF NATIONAL AND COMMUNITY LAW
The national authorities of several member states, in particular Belgium,
Germany, France, Ireland, and the United Kingdom, have, at least in theory,
some powers to control concentrations under existing national laws. Belgium
and the Netherlands are considering new legislation on mergers.5 8 Also,
other national legislation is sometimes used to prevent what are considered to
be undesirable concentrations.
National authorities would not seek to prevent mergers of corporations
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outside their countries, and Community law applies only when trade between
member states is affected, so some mergers would be subject only to one set
of legal rules or the other. However, a merger between, for example, a Ger-
man corporation and a British firm may now be subject to three laws, the
German and British national merger control legislation and Community law.
If Community law and applicable national laws both prohibit, or both
permit, a given merger, no difficulty is likely to arise. If Community law
prohibits a merger allowed by national law, Community law prevails. It is not
yet clear what the legal position is if Community law permits a merger but
national law does not.
In Walt Wilhelm v. Bundeskartellamt,59 an antitrust case (but not a
merger case), the Court of Justice said:
[I]n principle the national cartel authorities may take proceedings
also with regard to situations likely to be the subject of a decision by
the Commission. However, if the ultimate general aim of the Treaty is
to be respected, this parallel application of the national system can only
be allowed in so far as it does not prejudice the uniform application
throughout the Common Market of the Community rules on cartels
and of the full effect of the measures adopted in implementation of
those rules....
Article 87(2)(e), in conferring on a Community institution the
power to determine the relationship between national laws and the
Community rules on competition, confirms the supremacy of Commu-
nity law....
It would be contrary to the nature of [the EEC ] system to allow
member states to introduce or retain measures capable of prejudicing
the practical effectiveness of the Treaty. The binding force of the
Treaty and of measures taken in application of it must not differ from
one state to another as a result of internal measures, lest the function-
ing of the Community system should be impeded and the achievement
of the aims of the Treaty placed in peril. Consequently, conflicts be-
tween the rules of the Community and national rules in the matter of
the law on cartels must be resolved by applying the principle that Com-
munity law takes precedence.
Consequently, and so long as a regulation adopted pursuant to Article
87(2)(e) of the Treaty has not provided otherwise, national authorities
may take action against an agreement in accordance with their national
law, even when an examination of the agreement from the point of
view of its compatability with Community law is pending before the
Commission, subject however to the condition that the application of
national law may not prejudice the full and uniform application of
Community law or the effects of measures taken or to be taken to im-
plement it.
60
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The Court of Justice is clearly not saying that a national authority may
do as it likes, nor apparently is it saying that Community law has wholly
occupied the field. Rather, there appears to be a category of cases not clearly
defined in which action by national antitrust authorities would be incompat-
ible with Community law. The mere fact that the result might be different
under the two systems of law does not mean automatically that national law
cannot be applied.
In the area of exemptions from regulation under Article 85(3), there may
perhaps be two kinds of cases: (1) those where the Commission has granted
an exemption for an agreement of relatively little importance, not because it
promotes some very important Community objective but because there is no
strong objection to it, and (2) cases where the Commission has granted an
exemption for an agreement of great importance for Community policy in the
sector in question. If this distinction is valid, it would follow that national law
could be applied so as to prohibit an agreement in the first category but not
one in the second category. However, the first kind of case may not in fact
exist, and if it does not exist the legal position is clear. On the other hand, if
indeed the two categories exist, and if the Commission approved a restrictive
merger, acting under Article 85, it would have to be determined into which of
the two categories the case fell. In practice such cases would normally fall
within the second category, if the Commission confined itself to important
merger cases.
It seems clear from the wording of the draft merger regulation that if the
Commission authorizes a merger under the clause which permits authoriza-
tion for mergers "indispensable to an objective given priority treatment in the
common interest of the Community," it would be contrary to Community law
for a national antitrust authority to prohibit the merger.
6
1
How likely is a conflict over merger cases between the Commission and
a national antitrust authority? Not all the member states have authorities
with power to control mergers. It is possible to imagine a situation in which a
national authority might want to allow a merger at any cost to preserve jobs,
or might want to prevent a takeover by interests outside the member state in
question. But national antitrust policies are moving toward harmonization
with Community law on other issues, and national authorities might be glad
to have the help of the Commission either to prevent or to promote a contro-
versial merger. Though differences of opinion are perhaps more likely to arise
over merger policy than about restrictive agreements, the fact that there have
been so few differences of opinion in the application of Articles 85 and 86 is
encouraging.
Markert6 2 has suggested that the situation in relation to mergers could be
clarified by providing that all mergers falling under the regulation should be
exempt from national merger control laws, provided that the jurisdictional test
of an effect on trade between member states was objective and capable of
being readily applied, that the Commission's standards were not significantly
less strict than those of national authorities, and that the Commission has the
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administrative facilities necessary to carry out a prompt and thorough investi-
gation of all difficult cases. Meanwhile, practical solutions could be found
through cooperation between the Commission and national authorities.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE
Although a number of merger cases have been dealt with informally by the
Commission and are described in the annual competition policy reports of the
Commission, Continental Can remains the only formal decision on mergers
that has so far been adopted by the Commission. It is hardly possible there-
fore to outline a comprehensive EEC policy on mergers. 63 However, it is
possible to note a series of points about such a policy which have been
suggested from various sides, although none of them has ever been adopted
as the policy of the Commission.
Community merger policy will seek to limit itself to dealing with a small
number of truly important cases, initially horizontal mergers between com-
petitors, then vertical mergers, and finally conglomerate mergers much later.
It is believed that only a small number of very large mergers are likely to be
found to be contrary to the Community interest. Moreover, the small staff in
the Competition Directorate General of the Commission would not be in a
position to handle a large number of merger cases in addition to their exist-
ing work. Thus, this approach would therefore be adopted as a pragmatic
enforcement policy, whatever the exact terms of the merger regulation when
it is finally adopted. Consequently, businessmen need not anticipate Com-
mission involvement in any but the largest and most obviously anticompeti-
tive mergers. The Commission will of course seek more staff to handle
merger cases and may attempt to delegate simple restrictive practices cases
to national authorities and courts.
The Commission is likely to avoid articulating general policies, opting
instead for a case-by-case approach. This implies an approach adjusted to the
circumstances of each industry involved. The Committee on Economic and
Monetary Affairs said in 1973, "Probably... the Commission is not yet as
familiar with the conditions of competition and economic interlinking in the
Community as would really be desirable for a European monopoly authority.
'" 64
Community jurisdiction over mergers will be limited by two require-
ments. One or more of the corporations or groups of corporations involved
must be "established" in the EEC, and the merger must have an effect on
trade between member states. A merger affecting only the external trade of
the Community would not be subject to Community jurisdiction, because
Articles 85 and 86 and the merger regulation only apply when trade between
member states is affected. These broad principles would apply even if Com-
munity jurisdiction over mergers was based on a new interpretation of Article
85 rather than on the new merger regulation.
It is not clear how far the Commission would seek to exercise jurisdic-
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tion over a merger involving holding companies outside the EEC but with
subsidiaries established in the Common Market; in clear cases of attempted
evasion it would no doubt do so.
In considering the effects of a merger on competition, the Commission
will likely take into account actual or potential competition from outside the
Common Market as well as from competitors already established in it.
6 5
Economic studies carried out by the Commission and summarized in the
annual reports on Competition Policy show that concentration has increased
in European industry. For the reasons already referred to this is in general
probably desirable.
The Commission will tend to favor mergers across frontiers within the
Community rather than mergers between corporations or groups in the same
member state, because the former kind of mergers promote the economic
integration of the Community.6 6 This is a policy consideration with no paral-
lel in United States antitrust law.
A law granting an antitrust authority discretion to allow even seriously
anticompetitive mergers for overriding policy reasons is likely to be much
more difficult and controversial to administer (and much more difficult to
foresee) than a simple ban, notwithstanding the experience of the Commis-
sion and other European antitrust authorities in operating such "weighing-
up" rules. In performing this discretionary function, the Commission is likely
to be guided by the principles of Article 85(3) under which the merger must
be indispensable to promote an overriding Community objective, consumers
must get a fair share of the benefits to be obtained from it, and the merger
must not give the firms concerned the opportunity to eliminate competition.
Obviously, the benefits obtained from the merger must outweigh the harm
resulting from any restriction of competition." The Commission will also
refer to the rules laid down in Article 66 of the ECSC Treaty, in particular the
prohibition on mergers which evade competition rules by establishing an
artificially privileged position involving a substantial advantage in access to
supplies or markets.
Economies of scale are easy to allege and hard to prove. The Commis-
sion is unlikely to be much impressed by any argument about greater effi-
ciency due to larger size, or increased concentration, unless it is a very well
researched argument. There is evidence that these benefits are often not
obtained, or that these benefits are outweighed by the difficulties of running
large and complex enterprises. In any case, economies of scale can usually
be obtained through internal expansion, and the Commission's policy of con-
fining itself to large mergers should mean that no merger justified by econo-
mies of scale should come up for consideration.
6 8
As a matter of procedure, complaints about mergers can be expected
from corporations resisting a take-over bid or from competitors fearing the
emergence of more powerful rivals. The Commission will be compelled to
decide when it is appropriate to adopt interim (interlocutory) measures.
These questions have already arisen in merger cases and others under the
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European Coal and Steel Community Treaty and in the Camera Care case, a
refusal to supply case under the EEC Treaty.69
The Commission will not be anti-United States or anti-Japan in its
policies. Indeed, it is less likely to be so than the national authorities of some
of the member states might be, or might have been in the past. Furthermore,
the greater the degree of economic integration achieved within the Common
Market, the less difficult it will be for the Commission to have a clearly
coherent and consistent policy on mergers, not subject to adjustment to suit
special regional circumstances.
In assessing the effect of a proposed merger on competition the Commis-
sion is likely to focus primarily on market structure: the number of substan-
tial sellers and buyers on the market, the relative sizes of the market shares
of the firms, barriers to entry, the extent to which the Common Market forms
a unified market, and the degree of rigidity in distribution systems. The
Court of Justice has in several cases under Articles 85 and 86 emphasized
the importance of these factors, and one would expect them to be still more
important in merger cases.
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The effects of a proposed merger must be assessed primarily on struc-
tural criteria because a merger is approved on a permanent basis and its
long-term effects will not depend, for example, on whether the firms involved
have or have not practiced exclusionary behavior in the years before the
merger. The criteria written into the draft merger regulation for the absolute
prohibition of a merger are "the power to hinder effective competition in the
Common Market or in a substantial part thereof" and two quantitative crite-
ria premised on turnover and market share. The phrase quoted is likely to be
interpreted in the light of the case law of the Court of Justice on dominance
under Article 86, which gives some weight to factors other than market
share.
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Both the Continental Can rule and the draft merger regulation prohibit
the acquisition of dominant power through mergers (though the regulation
has certain exceptions). Under the Treaty, dominant power legitimately ac-
quired is subject to restraints on behavior under Article 86, but not to divesti-
ture. However, it would not be an argument in favor of a merger that the
Commission will in any event retain the power to control the behavior of the
new dominant firm.
In horizontal merger cases one would expect the Commission to seek to
prevent significant additional concentration and the elimination of important
competitors. Market shares would be the principal criterion used, but not the
only one. The Commission can also be expected to follow a stricter enforce-
ment policy when the industry concerned is becoming more concentrated
than when the merger takes place in an otherwise static situation. Therefore,
the Commission will be attentive to trends in market structure as well as
market shares. The Commission would probably also tend to favor a merger
necessary to keep a firm in business if no less restrictive course of action was
available. No figures can be given for the percentage market shares which
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would trigger Commission intervention, although some indications can per-
haps be obtained from the cases under Article 86, notably United Brands and
Hoffmann-LaRoche.
EEC antitrust law does not limit itself to horizontal mergers, and it is
clear that the rules also prohibit vertical mergers with substantial anticom-
petitive effects, such as raising barriers to entry or creating competitive dis-
advantages for other corporations (as distinct from making the merged firm
more efficient) by cutting off their access to customers or suppliers.
72
Nothing useful at this stage can be said about probable EEC antitrust
policy on conglomerate mergers, although no doubt mergers involving poten-
tial entrants and mergers making uncompetitive reciprocal buying probable
will be looked at carefully.
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